If at first you don't succeed: Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty.

In June 2008, a proud nation riding on a wave of prosperity voted no to the Lisbon Treaty. On October the 2nd the people of Ireland will vote again. The current landscape is vastly different to that of June 2008. With hopes that the Irish banks are solvent looking increasingly fanciful, house prices down 20-30 percent and still falling, and unemployment at a 14 year high the swagger of the Celtic tiger has been humbled. What does this mean for Eurocrats anxiously chewing their nails in Brussels?

At the moment it is looking likely that they will soon be able to rouse from EU from its institutional hibernation and into an era of a European President, a diplomatic service and perhaps a European army. Unfortunately, the no vote of last year was more an inditement of the incompetence of Irish politicians, voters parochial focus, and the vulnerability of the public to base, if well funded, scaremongering. The government’s negotiation of guarantees regarding the autonomy of Ireland’s policy on military neutrality, taxes and abortion will starve the no campaign of its signature objection. The Irish people have come to the realisation that a country of 4 million people cannot claw its way out of such a deep economic quagmire without the benefits of EU membership. Similarly, the government has hopefully learned its lesson and we should not see a repeat of the mind-blowing naivety displayed by the Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern when he admitted to the press that he had not read the treaty. These evolutions all favour a Yes vote. However, lets look at these areas in more detail.

According to a recent report by 66 leading non-government economists, while it is difficult to compute the exact benefits of a Yes vote, the deleterious effects of a No vote are much easy to identify. A No vote would impact negatively on international confidence in the Irish economy and thus increase our cost of borrowing. Similarly, our role as a committed member of the EU helps attract international investment. DFI is the lifeblood of the Irish economy, a no vote would imperil our attractiveness to large multinationals looking for a base in Western Europe. On balance 91 percent of the economists believed that from a purely economic point of view Ireland should vote yes.

It is also relevant to note that the result of Ireland’s vote will have effects far beyond those on the Irish economy or the careers of EU Presidential hopefuls. As an economic and regulatory pole the institutional health of the EU directly impacts on the countries which border it. A revitalised EU would act as a stabilising and moderating force across Russia’s eastern borders as well as in Turkey and thus into the Middle East. An outdated and stagnant structure could well provoke instability. This is a reality, our actions do not happen in a vacuum and we should not act like they do.

Thankfully, a majority of Irish people see Ireland’s membership of the EU as a positive thing, a recent Irish Times poll put that number at 80 percent. The challenge for the Yes campaigners is to motivate voters given the treaty is largely a matter of improving political and administrative procedures. Sexy it is not. However, by centering their campaign about whether we want to be part of a more effective European Union, banishing any lingering complacency and ruthlessly countering the No campaign’s propaganda a Yes vote is highly achievable. MEP’s fingernails should be safe.

Is Europe irrelvant?

Europe is what the French term “le vieux continent”. The continent from whose midst sprang explorers and colonisers, thinkers and emperors, and both the industrial and the agricultural revolutions. However, while the internal landscape of what Mark Mazower termed the “Dark Continent” has arguably become somewhat brighter, is its ability to project its influence across the world slowly fading away?

Europe’s influence, as once manifested by British naval dominance or the Dutch trading empire, is but a distant memory. Although Europe’s economic and military strength arguably began to wane, at least in relative terms, from the beginning of the 20th century it took the Second World War to force the European elites to face up to this harsh reality. Their response was to look to the US, and to project an image of Europe as an ideological, economic and strategic ally, a bulwark vital to preserving US security. This perception was mutual and post WW II Europe’s security and prosperity were greatly aided by both American dollars (Marshall Aid) and guns (NATO).

However, any depiction of Europe as an exhausted continent surviving by virtue of American largesse and defined solely by an American tropism is overly simplistic. Efforts to construct, a European union which would fuse the various attributes of the European Nation states into one cohesive and potent actor have progressed, albeit at a varying pace, since its foundations were sketched out by the Treaty of Rome in 1958. Indeed, the EU is now a Union of 27 countries, a Union which continues to pursue the goal of a borderless economic area with the free movement of capital, goods and people. With a central bank and a common currency to which 16 states adhere, the EU is the singular most successful example of regional integration in the world. Taken as a single entity it is the largest economic unit in the world with a GDP of over $13 billion (PPP).

With this statistic in hand it would seem hard to dismiss the EU as irrelevant, for surely the world’s largest economy has enormous influence in a world seemingly mesmerized by materialism. Yet this fact simply papers over the reality that the European Union remains a grouping of states who seek above all to guard and then to maximise their self interest. As a consequence any effort to act as a coherent bloc engenders a long and complex process which ends in deadlock more often than in agreement. The economic sword which Europe wields is ultimately blunted by the reality that it remains a collection of nation states.

Europe’s hand is further weakened by the demographic weakness of the continent, or what is commonly referred to as its “ticking time bomb”. Europe’s population is growing older and while this may render conflict less likely it also poses significant fiscal challenges to Europe’s current system of social welfare and pensions. The US has a stronger demographic outlook while India and other developing countries make Europe’s demographic look like a form of advanced sclerosis. Militarily Europe is a pale shadow of its former self. European defence spending languishes at around 1.7%, compared to US spending which stood at just over 5% in 2008, while China continues to increase its defence budget by over 10% annually. Robert Kagan’s quip that Europeans are from Venus while Americans are from Mars seems to ring true.

Several recent events lend credence to the thesis that European influence and power are on a downward slope. Russia felt confident enough to both invade Georgia and to engage in a diplomatic conflict with Britain within the last year. Following the disturbances in the aftermath of the disputed elections in Iran, it was British diplomats who were detained rather than those of the “great Satan”. Britain one of Europe’s most powerful countries is perceived as toothless. China’s decision to cancel the EU-China summit in 2008 as well as moves towards a G 2 unit seems to confirm the hypothesis of a European decline towards irrelevance.

However, there are certain recent trends or even points of view which contradict the notion of a degenerative European decline. Firstly, the ideological conflict derided as passé by Fukuyama and others in the 1990’s is back. This is evident when one looks at the increasingly alluring form of authoritarian capitalism which has catapulted China into its role as a superpower and which until recently seemed to be propelling Russia back to its former greatness. Faced with this challenge, Europe the continent which invented what has proven to be the most effective form of political organisation in history – the nation state – can play a key role in reinforcing the bedrock of liberal democracy on which the US is built. The US should not underestimate the role that Europe can play in disseminating and protecting the values which the US prizes. This role has been reinforced within the last 10 months as the ideology behind profit driven US capitalism has been discredited by the financial crisis and the ensuing economic downturn. Europe’s social market capitalism has suddenly become increasingly attractive to countries who have been shocked by the widespread destruction seemingly inherent to the American model. This ideological influence confers Europe with a sense of relevancy which it would appear difficult to ignore, in particular in the midst of current efforts to reform capitalism.

Using the definition advanced by Joseph Nye which sees power as a diffuse and multiform concept one can point to this ideological influence as well as the EU’s ability to create rapidly universalising norms, regulations and standards as evidence of the EU’s widespread “soft power”. The fact that the Wall Street Journal and other papers have begun to refer to Europe’s efforts to enforce various norms as proof of its “normative imperialism”, suggests influence and power and definitely not irrelevance. Similarly the fact that Europe contains two states who are both permanent members of the UN security council and have nuclear weapons denotes a certain relevance.

A further point of view is that of Gideon Rachman who sees Europe’s weakness as the means of acceding to a sort of “nirvana”, a way for Europe to surrender the multitude of responsibilities which clutter the agendas of the world’s great powers. For him, Europe has thrown off its yoke and the “white mans burden” or a sense of a “mission civilisatrice” have no place in the new Europe. I agree with him that Europe’s presence on the world stage has shrunk considerably from the giddy heights of the pre-20th century world. However, it is far from irrelevant. Nonetheless, the question as to whether the path towards irrelevance is an attractive one demands serious reflection.

The success of Europe’s endeavour to become the pioneer of a new type of power will ultimately define the continents relevance in the 21st century.

Going Soft. Does Barack Obama need to start flexing his muscles?

During the Presidential campaign and even during the primaries, Obama’s opponents were swift to underline his relative lack of foreign policy experience and question his ability to make tough decisions. Following his election, his subsequent commitment to dialogue and the abandonment of the Bush era Manichean rhetoric these voices began to decry the Carter-esque weakness of President Obama. To critics such as Rush Limbaugh he is too soft on America’s enemies and too quick to talk where only force will be understood. To what extent, if any, are these criticisms valid?

President Obama has made it clear that he views the world through a prism almost diametrically opposed to that which coloured the thoughts of George Bush. Where Bush saw the need to assert US hegemony through overwhelming force, a fact succinctly illustrated by the label applied to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Operation Shock and Awe), Obama seems more motivated by the pressing need to counter the anti-American sentiment which has blossomed in many parts of the world during the past decade with dialogue and engagement. Take Iran for example, where Bush seemed only to threaten a metal fist Obama has extended an outstretched hand- albeit one that has yet to be accepted.

While dialogue and engagement were also employed during the Bush era, the six party talks involving N Korea being one such example, they seemed to take a back seat to a more abrasive approach. Following the recent N Korean nuclear test Obama has increasingly come under fire for not knowing when to change track from soft to hard power. Obama’s capacity to at once empathise and reason, lecture and enquire, reassure and challenge would seem to be of little use when confronted by the intransigence of the isolated dictator. Words carry very little, and probably no, influence at the court of Kim Jong-il. Elsewhere, Benjamin Netanyahu’s unwillingness to bend to President Obama’s will with regard to the halting of the expansion of Israeli settlements seems to be another failure of soft power when faced with a refusal to compromise.

Yet this reading of both the North Korean and Israeli case are somewhat misleading. By engaging the other four members of the six party talks the “soft” approach can still exert pressure on Kim Jong-il’s regime through the tightening of closely targeted financial sanctions and reassure its neighbours through the formulation of a cohesive contingency plan. Similarly while Mr Netanyahu may seem closed Obama’s suggestions, Obama’s speech in Cairo may well have laid the groundwork for a fundamental rethink of US policy which would force Netanyahu into making the decision between compromise and profound damage to the US-Israeli relationships. Similarly, critics of Obama’s supposed reticence to respond decisively to pressing foreign policy concerns often overlook the fact that he is sending 20,000 more troops to Afghanistan and that drone attacks on targets in the AfPak area have increased since he came to power.

The much needed paradigm shift from the ineffective and ultimately self defeating world view of Bush should be welcomed by Americans as a valuable opportunity to reverse the decline of Amerian power and influence in face of what is increasingly being called the “Asian century”. The attempt to tar Obama with the label of an overly soft President is a reduction a more complex reality. The desire to engage with countries of great importance for global stability is both laudatory and necessary. The real danger, as Gideon Rachman so astutely pointed out in a recent article in the Financial Times, is that expectations for soft power surpass realistic barometers, for as Obama himself pointed out in his speech in Cairo - words alone are not enough.

However, Obama is aware that a successful combination of both soft and hard power is integral to the formulation of the “smart power” America must exude if it is to consolidate or even maintain its influence on a rapidly evolving world stage. Thus, Obama’s efforts to reinvigorate US soft power should be welcomed and not scorned. President Obama’s foreign policy does not rest purely on eloquent speeches and empathetic sentiment but rather on a pragmatic blend of both his and America’s strengths.

If this approach is deserving of criticism, I must be missing something?

Economic sanctions.

The recent underground nuclear test in North Korea has once again focused minds on the pressing need to control nuclear proliferation. Mr Obama’s laudable desire to see a non-nuclear world appears a distant utopia when confronted by the determined efforts of states such as N. Korea and Iran to arm themselves with nuclear capabilities. To most sane commentators the question is not should these two countries be permitted or even encouraged in their quest, but rather how can the rest of the world stop this quest before it becomes an even greater threat to regional stability. Inevitably, the responses to these two scenarios have varied, in large part as a function of the proponent’s position in the political spectrum, with diehard neo-cons continuing to support a surgical bombing campaign and more liberal aspects proposing dialogue backed up by a more comprehensive raft of economic sanctions.

While the absence of large scale public support for military intervention in Iran or North Korea as well as resource shortages have rendered it far less likely than it appeared to be in 2006 or even 2007, economic sanctions have remained at the forefront of many proposals. However, the effectiveness, desirability and morality of economic sanctions are the subject of much debate. Are economic sanctions effective in targeting political regimes? Should the US and other countries continue to build many of the policies around their implementation?

Many, but not all, of the criticisms levelled against economic sanctions originate in the humanitarian domain. The UN sanctions imposed on Iraq during the 1990’s are a vivid illustration of the negative effects of sanctions on the welfare of the people who live under the target regime. A 2003 report by the Norwegian Red Cross cited a negative correlation between economic sanctions and average life expectancy and employment levels, and a positive correlation with infant mortality. The suffering which these measures inflict upon the population leads to a number of outcomes; firstly it can lead to a criminalization of the economy and of civil society of both the target country and even neighbouring states, as people try to bypass the sanctions, and secondly it can lead to a “rally around the flag effect” and the demonization of the countries or bodies imposing the sanctions.

In response to these criticisms, the last decade has seen the emergence of the concept of “smart sanctions”. Much like the bombs from which they derives their name these aim to minimise the deleterious effects of the sanctions on the general population by specifically targeting the political regime through instruments such
as asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes.

Efforts to justify the use of general economic sanctions and the human suffering inflicted by them is often based upon the belief that the benefits outweigh the costs and that other policy instruments such as crude force have a much higher human cost. Similarly, while the seminal work on the topic “Economic sanctions reconsidered” states that economic sanctions have only been effective in the partial or full attainment of their goals in 34 percent of the cases examined between 1914 and 2000, David Baldwin reminds us in “Economic Statecraft” that few other policy options except perhaps, direct application of military force have a higher success rate.

Faced with leaders as intransigent as Kim Jong Il the reality is that sanctions can often appear to the most politically expedient response to conflicts which offer few, if any, viable solutions. Economic sanctions demonstrate a will to tackle a problem, while avoiding often unpopular and costly direct intervention. However, their symbolic potency is enfeebled by increasing systemic impotency. In order for economic sanctions to be effective they have to be multilateral, and with the current recalibration of world power and the competition for influence and resources which this has engendered, consensus is far from easy to achieve. Also the level of influence which sanctions exercise is often a function of their impact on the country’s economic well being, and thus is closely linked to their impact on the well being of the population.

So where does that leave us? Economic sanctions often negatively impact on the well being of the people of the countries they target, yet both their efficiency and their inherent weakness springs from the level of economic stagnation they provoke. “Smart sanctions” seem on paper to annihilate the worrying side-effects but also risk not having the dosage necessary to solve the problem. Under domestic and international pressure to act politicians often take refuge behind the imposition of sanctions while failing to identify clear goals which they are supposed to achieved.

Economic sanctions are a lever of influence which can play an important role in foreign policy. However their efficiency is reliant on their implementation alongside other policy instruments, as part of a multilateral agenda and in the search of pursuit of clearly defined goals. Both North Korea and Iran illustrate the limits of sanctions, the difficulties of effectively targeting specific programs and the challenges posed to enforcement by a world defined to a large degree by globalisation and the multiplicity of trade and communication channels. While economic sanctions are by no means an end goal in themselves, they are a means of getting there. It is policy makers own interest to clearly demarcate the often blurry line between moral probity and political expediency.

A cry for help. But should we listen?

Back in February of this year Morgan Tsvangirai led his party into a unity government with the Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai declared that although he was well aware of the risks implied by this strategy, he believed it best served the interests of the Zimbabwean people. Meanwhile, the rest of the world looked on sceptically, withholding financial support until they could see “evidence of true power sharing as well as inclusive and effective governance”.

Unfortunately, the world still waits for clear signs of any real devolution of power from Mugabe and his cronies to the MDC. Thus, while Mr Tsvangirai recently made a plea to the international community to provide Zimbabwe with the money it needs to escape the downward spiral of poverty, violence and crime into which it has descended, the US, the UK and other states remain hesitant to break out the check books.

The case of Zimbabwe aptly illustrates a dilemma which is oft replayed on the world stage. A country with a rather insalubrious ruler, a populace on the brink of starvation, and an opposition party whose existence is precarious, seems to be at last turning to a new and brighter page of its history. However, the old guard remains entrenched in the apparatus of the state and consequently donor countries not only fear that any final support would be siphoned off by corrupt bureaucrats and politicians but also that any help would encourage stagnation rather than progression by hiding the need for profound systemic reform.

In a previous post I questioned the validity of the principles underlying the fundamentals behind seemingly indefinite aid flows, but in this case, the case for financial support to help restart an almost decimated economy and restore a failed health and educational infrastructure appears in my opinion to be relatively sound. If it was certain that the €6.2 billion requested by Mr Tsvangirai would go towards rebuilding the country and helping the Zimbabweans the decision would be far more straight forward, but recent signals and even a cursory look at the country’s institutions makes this seem unlikely.

The imprisonment last week of two journalists who had dared to criticise the regime and of a prominent human rights lawyer illustrates the continually oppressive nature of the Zimbabwean regime. Mugabe’s refusal to remove his supporters from the post of Attorney general and from senior positions in the Central Bank as well as a renewed wave of farm occupation by ZANU-PF loyalists suggests that few if any profound changes have occurred.

Mr Tsvangirai continues to assert his belief that the only way forward is to work alongside Mugabe as a stepping stone to a new beginning. Unfortunately, Mugabe’s intransigence and the continued scepticism of the international community could see the Zimbabwean people’s last vestiges of hope swept away by a further wave of violence, disease and famine.