Economic sanctions.

The recent underground nuclear test in North Korea has once again focused minds on the pressing need to control nuclear proliferation. Mr Obama’s laudable desire to see a non-nuclear world appears a distant utopia when confronted by the determined efforts of states such as N. Korea and Iran to arm themselves with nuclear capabilities. To most sane commentators the question is not should these two countries be permitted or even encouraged in their quest, but rather how can the rest of the world stop this quest before it becomes an even greater threat to regional stability. Inevitably, the responses to these two scenarios have varied, in large part as a function of the proponent’s position in the political spectrum, with diehard neo-cons continuing to support a surgical bombing campaign and more liberal aspects proposing dialogue backed up by a more comprehensive raft of economic sanctions.

While the absence of large scale public support for military intervention in Iran or North Korea as well as resource shortages have rendered it far less likely than it appeared to be in 2006 or even 2007, economic sanctions have remained at the forefront of many proposals. However, the effectiveness, desirability and morality of economic sanctions are the subject of much debate. Are economic sanctions effective in targeting political regimes? Should the US and other countries continue to build many of the policies around their implementation?

Many, but not all, of the criticisms levelled against economic sanctions originate in the humanitarian domain. The UN sanctions imposed on Iraq during the 1990’s are a vivid illustration of the negative effects of sanctions on the welfare of the people who live under the target regime. A 2003 report by the Norwegian Red Cross cited a negative correlation between economic sanctions and average life expectancy and employment levels, and a positive correlation with infant mortality. The suffering which these measures inflict upon the population leads to a number of outcomes; firstly it can lead to a criminalization of the economy and of civil society of both the target country and even neighbouring states, as people try to bypass the sanctions, and secondly it can lead to a “rally around the flag effect” and the demonization of the countries or bodies imposing the sanctions.

In response to these criticisms, the last decade has seen the emergence of the concept of “smart sanctions”. Much like the bombs from which they derives their name these aim to minimise the deleterious effects of the sanctions on the general population by specifically targeting the political regime through instruments such
as asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes.

Efforts to justify the use of general economic sanctions and the human suffering inflicted by them is often based upon the belief that the benefits outweigh the costs and that other policy instruments such as crude force have a much higher human cost. Similarly, while the seminal work on the topic “Economic sanctions reconsidered” states that economic sanctions have only been effective in the partial or full attainment of their goals in 34 percent of the cases examined between 1914 and 2000, David Baldwin reminds us in “Economic Statecraft” that few other policy options except perhaps, direct application of military force have a higher success rate.

Faced with leaders as intransigent as Kim Jong Il the reality is that sanctions can often appear to the most politically expedient response to conflicts which offer few, if any, viable solutions. Economic sanctions demonstrate a will to tackle a problem, while avoiding often unpopular and costly direct intervention. However, their symbolic potency is enfeebled by increasing systemic impotency. In order for economic sanctions to be effective they have to be multilateral, and with the current recalibration of world power and the competition for influence and resources which this has engendered, consensus is far from easy to achieve. Also the level of influence which sanctions exercise is often a function of their impact on the country’s economic well being, and thus is closely linked to their impact on the well being of the population.

So where does that leave us? Economic sanctions often negatively impact on the well being of the people of the countries they target, yet both their efficiency and their inherent weakness springs from the level of economic stagnation they provoke. “Smart sanctions” seem on paper to annihilate the worrying side-effects but also risk not having the dosage necessary to solve the problem. Under domestic and international pressure to act politicians often take refuge behind the imposition of sanctions while failing to identify clear goals which they are supposed to achieved.

Economic sanctions are a lever of influence which can play an important role in foreign policy. However their efficiency is reliant on their implementation alongside other policy instruments, as part of a multilateral agenda and in the search of pursuit of clearly defined goals. Both North Korea and Iran illustrate the limits of sanctions, the difficulties of effectively targeting specific programs and the challenges posed to enforcement by a world defined to a large degree by globalisation and the multiplicity of trade and communication channels. While economic sanctions are by no means an end goal in themselves, they are a means of getting there. It is policy makers own interest to clearly demarcate the often blurry line between moral probity and political expediency.