Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: The legacy of a failed state.

In recent weeks pictures of teary reunions between liberated crew members and their families have once again brought piracy back to centre stage. Daring commando raids and Kalashnikov totting pirates have been gold-dust for a media otherwise engaged in an increasingly stale commentary of the global recession. Several prominent leaders have affirmed their commitment to combating the scourge of piracy, President Obama declaring that he was “resolved to halt the rise of poverty”.

In the meantime, attacks in the Gulf of Aden have continued and both ships and crews from all around the world are docked off the coast of Somalia in the possession of various pirate gangs. The response to the increased threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, while politically expedient is likely to be prove ineffective. Reinforcing the Naval presence in the area while potentially helpful is merely a superficial response to a more profound problem. With a vast area to patrol, 6.6 million square kilometres, and a limited number of ships, the international naval presence is spread thin.

The Gulf of Aden is a vital artery for world trade and approximately 20,000 ships pass through it every year. According to the International Maritime Bureau there were 111 attacks on shipping in the gulf last year of which 42 were successful. Sources from nearby countries put the ransom money from these operations at $350 million, a very significant amount in a country where GDP per capita hovers around $600. In recent months the naval presence in the area has been bulked up with forces now hailing from China, India, Italy, Russia, France, the United States, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Greece, Turkey, Britain, and Germany patrolling the waters off the coast of Somlia. However, this approach seems to be having little or no effect on the security of shipping in the area, with the Maritime Bureau reporting over 70 attacks so far this year.

While the success percentage of the attacks is relatively low and the percentage likelihood of a boat even being attacked in the Gulf of Aden is around 0.5%, the threat from piracy has had several significant consequences. Insurance costs for boats travelling in this area have increased, and this twinned with the fear of attack has led to many ships being diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, resulting in higher costs and slower transport times. Also, boats passing through the Gulf pay for access to the Suez Canal providing much welcome income to the Egyptian government, with revenues declining Somali piracy could have a negative impact on regional stability. Estimates of the total cost of global piracy range from $1 billion to as high as $16 billion

How should be respond to the growing threat of piracy? The sheer vastness of the area to be patrolled renders patrols mostly ineffective, and shipping companies reject calls for convoys on the grounds that they would introduce too many constraints on ship movements. The UN introduced passed four resolutions in 2008 which aimed to help combat piracy by permitting the pursuit of pirates within Somali jurisdiction (with Somalia’s consent). Yet the reality is that prosecuting pirates is almost impossible due to the innumerable complexities of international law. Recent debates have centred on possible links between terrorism and piracy, but the links between the two seem at best “tenuous”.

Any responses up until this point have been almost entirely defensive in nature; arming crews, hiring private security to protect boats, and as discussed above increased naval patrols. Other suggestions are the formation of a regional anti-piracy framework such as that which was effective in combating pirates in the Straits of Malacca, which link the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. However this proposal, as well as that for the formation of a Somali coast guard, tend to overlook the internal instability in Somalia which renders any such step almost impossible. For as Defence Secretary Robert Gates recently stated “piracy will continue to flourish in the area until a stable government is installed in Mogadishu”.

The link between the absence of any central Somali authority and the growing incidences of piracy is illustrated by the fact that during the brief rule of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 attacks in the Gulf were almost non-existent. However, political appetite for intervention to reinforce the authority of a Somali government could not be less. Not only does the US have haunting memories of the ill-fated military intervention in 1993 which has become synonymous with the call “Black hawk down”, but current interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are currently absorbing the energies of many western nations.

What does this mean? The reality is that while the pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden are a threat both to commerce and to the safety of crews, this threat is not sufficient to justify the land based intervention that is necessary to tackle the root of the problem. States and shipping companies will continue to follow a defensive strategy, aiming to minimise the number and success of pirate attacks. Meanwhile, the pirates will continue to invest in faster boats, better weaponry and more advanced technology. An escalation of violence, especially in the aftermath of recent US and French commando operations, seems almost inevitable.